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Abstract
We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behavior
simultaneously. If for competitive behavior two-fund separation holds across periods then it
also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not depend
on whether agents behave strategically or competitively. Those agents acting strategically will
however invest less in the common mutual fund. Constant relative risk aversion and absence
of aggregate risk are shown to be two alternative sufficient conditions for two-period fund
separation. With derivatives further strategic aspects arise and strategic behavior is distinct
from competitive behavior even for those utility functions leading to two-fund separation.
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1 Introduction
Standard asset pricing models, as for example the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM, are based
on the assumption that all market participants take prices as given. These models give a first
intuition for the valuation of assets when portfolio considerations and diversification are impor-
tant. Moreover, these models are general in the sense that they can be applied to an arbitrary
number of assets. They can however not cope with important issues that practitioners face when
a lack of liquidity of markets and so called ”slippage” of asset prices are a major concern. The
market impact of portfolio decisions is clearly taken into account by institutional investors like
pension funds that in most markets hold most of the assets. Also, many hedge funds limit their
assets under management because running their strategies with too much capital would eliminate
the potential gains from their strategies. Moreover, to benefit from portfolio diversification large
investors and hedge funds invest on many markets simultaneously. To cope with these issues while
keeping the benefits of portfolio diversification, models of simultaneous strategic interaction on a
large number of asset markets are needed.
The idea of this paper is to systematically compare price taking and strategic behavior for a
simple asset market with simultaneous competition on arbitrary many assets. The price of this
generality is that we limit our attention to symmetric information models with a given complete
participation on asset markets. Also in our paper initially investors are not endowed with assets so
that changing the market price does not change the wealth of the investor. These aspects should
be considered once the difference of strategic and competitive behavior has been understood in our
more simple setting.
We consider a two period model with a finite number of states in the second period. A finite
number of investors are endowed with wealth that can be spent on first period consumption and
on a finite number of assets (bonds and shares) delivering state contingent payoffs in the second
period. We assume that every investor is small on the market for first period consumption. First
period consumption resembles the real GDP of the world. On this market a large number of
producers, pure consumers, and investors interact and so we assume that even large investors are
small. Warren Buffet and George Soros, for example, are estimated to manage wealth of approxi-
mately a couple of billions USD. This is a huge amount as compared to the market capitalization
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for individual stocks, while it can be neglected relative to the world’s GDP. Asset markets can be
complete or incomplete. In our model asset payoffs are the only source to finance second period
consumption. All consumers split their wealth between first period consumption and a portfolio of
assets in order to maximize intertemporal utility. On the asset market we allow for competitively
and also for strategically acting investors. In the first case the investors take prices as given while
in the second case they take the market impact of their demand into account. One may argue
that these different types of behavior can arise if estimating the market impact is costly because
it requires data bases and research facilities so that only some investors have a sufficient incentive
to consider their market impact. However, these arguments are beyond our model. Throughout
the paper we assume that investors have expected utility functions with homogenous beliefs. As
it is well known, for example from Magill and Qunizii [12], the CAPM is the special case of our
model which is obtained with only competitively acting investors and quadratic von-Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions. With respect to the strategic behavior the model is similar to the
famous Shapley-Shubik [17] Market Game. It will turn out that the number of assets obtained by
any investor are given by the ratio of the wealth he has ”bet” on that asset divided by the total
wealth bet on that asset. One important difference to the Shapley-Shubik model will be that in our
model assets are in fixed exogenous supply and income does not depend on the market outcome.
Hence in contrast to the Shapley-Shubik model we can easily ensure that the budget restrictions
hold. We formulate the agents’ decisions in terms of budget shares that are required to add up to
one. This formulation of the investment problem in terms of wealth shares, the so called ”asset
allocation”, is standard in finance. It allows to discuss investment decisions based on returns, i.e.
payoffs per price of assets. Keeping this convention, our results are more easily comparable to the
finance literature.
The aim of our paper is to analyze under which conditions and in which respect strategic in-
vestment behavior differs from competitive behavior. To start with, we show that, as the number
of investors becomes large, strategic behavior tends to competitive behavior. For a general account
of this so called Cournotian foundation of competitive equilibria see Mas-Colell [14]. To obtain
this result we let the economy grow in a very symmetric way. In each step one additional identical
copy, a replica, of the strategic agents is introduced. Ever since Debreu and Scarf [6] such limit
results for replica economies are well know in the general equilibrium literature (cf. Hildenbrand
and Kirman [9]). Since in our model the supply is exogenous we increase it proportionally to the
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number of consumers in our economy. Besides this standard result on the convergence of strategic
and competitive behavior we give sufficient conditions for finite economies, such that with respect
to the asset allocation problem strategic and competitive behavior become identical. We show
that if a form of fund separation holds for competitive behavior – that we suggest to call two
period fund separation – then strategically acting agents will form the same portfolio of assets as
competitive agents do. Both types of behavior do however differ with respect to the amount of
wealth invested in the common mutual fund of assets. The strategically acting investors take into
account that their demand will let prices move to their disadvantage and hence invest less into
assets as compared to investors with identical characteristics that behave competitively. We also
give sufficient conditions for two period fund separation. One of them is constant relative risk
aversion, CRRA, the other no-aggregate risk, NAR.
The asset pricing implications of two period fund separation are that the ratios of the prices
of risky assets do not depend on whether agents behave competitively or strategically. Moreover,
for the case of no-aggregate risk the weight of any asset in the mutual fund turns out to be the
expected value of its payoff relative to the total payoff of all assets. This coincides with so called
log-optimal pricing (cf. Luenberger [11], chapter 15). It is well known that log-optimal pricing is
also obtained if all investors – acting competitively – have logarithmic von-Neumann Morgenstern
utilities, a special case of CRRA (cf. Kraus and Litzenberger [10]). We show that this is still true
if one allows for strategic behavior.
In the case of the CAPM, heterogeneity in market behavior matters if there is aggregate risk.
We observe that then strategically and competitively acting agents do choose substantially differ-
ent portfolios and hence asset prices differ substantially. On the other hand, if the market does
not exhibit aggregate risk, both investors, even if they differ in their strategic behavior, choose the
same portfolio. Introducing derivatives leads to a new strategic aspect of the model. On changing
demand for the underlying asset, agents can change the payoffs of the derivatives that are based
on the prices of that underlying. Indeed in this case it turns out that even with logarithmic utility
functions equilibria depend substantially on the form of market behavior.
There is an impressive literature on strategic competition in general equilibrium models. This
literature has at least the two lines originating in Gabszewicz and Vial [8] and Shapley-Shubik
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[17]. For a recent account see the recent special issue of the Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Vol. 39, Nos. 5-6, edited by Gae¨l Giraud. In this respect our contributionis that we highlight the
importance of two-fund separation to obtain more specific results. The cases under which we show
that two-period fund separation holds, CRRA and NAR, are clearly not general in the set of all
theoretically possible economies but they are important cases studied extensively in the finance
literature. Ever since Merton [15] CRRA has become the ”work horse” of finance. Also Camp-
bell and Viceira [4] (page 24) argue convincingly that only the case of CRRA is compatible with
observed aggregate time series of consumption and risk premia: Wealth has grown considerably
while the risk premium remained quite stable over time. The second case for which we can show
two-period fund separation is the case of no aggregate risk. Ever since Borch [2] and Malinvaud
[13] also this case has been extensively studied in the literature. It is the work horse case for
insurance theory.
In the finance literature market impact has been a serious concern, for example, in the field
of derivatives (cf. Taleb [19]), when asymmetric information (cf. Brunnermeier [3]) has been con-
sidered and in models with endogenous market participation (cf. Pagano [16]). Only the case of
derivatives seems sufficiently similar to the model considered here. When presenting our results
in section 6.1 concerning derivatives, we will discuss the difference of this literature to our approach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section gives the details of the model.
Then we suggest an equilibrium concept, that we call Competitive Nash Equilibrium, CNE, in
which we study competitive and strategic behavior simultaneously. Having made the equilibrium
notion precise we demonstrate the limit theorem. Thereafter, two-period fund separation is de-
fined and it is shown that under standard differentiability assumptions on the utility functions,
CNE with two period fund separation do exist. Then we show that CRRA and NAR are suffi-
cient conditions for CNE with two period fund separation. Based on this, the pricing implications
are derived. Also, when presenting the general results we give numerical examples for the CAPM
case and the log-utility case to illustrate the robustness. Finally, we consider the case of derivatives.
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2 The model
In the following we define the model we are concerned with. The definition is divided into mainly
two parts, the first one concerns the market while the second one concerns the characteristics of
the agents on the market.
2.1 The market (q,A)
We consider a 2 periods model with periods t = 0 and t = 1 of an economy with S states s and K
assets k. Let us denote by S0 := {0} ∪ S the set of states, where for convenience s = 0 is the state
at time 0, and S := {1, .., S} is the set of states at time 1. Let k = 0 be the consumption good,
while K = {1, ..,K} is the set of assets available at time 1.
Let A ∈ RK×S+ be the matrix of non-negative payoffs of the assets k ∈ K over states s ∈ S.
We assume that there are no redundant assets, i.e. rank A = K. Assets k ∈ K are in exogenous
supply which is normalized to 1, while the consumption good is in ∞−elastic supply. q ∈ RK+ is
the price system on the market A, while the price for the consumption good is normalized to 1.
2.2 The investor i
Let I = {1, .., I} be the set of investors on the market. It is assumed that investors have ho-
mogenous believes about states in period 1, i.e. pi = p ∈ ∆S+ is the vector of probabilities for
states s ∈ S. An investor is characterized by his first period wealth (endowment) wi ∈ R+ and
by his utility Ui on his consumption in periods t = 0, 1. His investment strategy is denoted by
λi = λi(wi) =
(
λi0(wi),λ
i
1(wi)
)
∈ RK+1+ , where λi0(wi) is his (budget) share of investment in the
consumption good and λi1(wi) is his investment in assets k ∈ K on A. Let λ = (λi, i ∈ I) be
the vector of investment strategies over the investor population I. Each investor i is supposed to
partition all his wealth into 0 period consumption and investment in assets k ∈ K to obtain 1-st
period consumption. Formally, his budget constraint therefore reads
∑K
k=0 λ
i
k = 1 or equivalently
λi ∈ ∆K+1+ , ∀i ∈ I. Note that we exclude short sales. This exclusion is a consequence of allow-
ing for strategic behavior. Strategically acting agents know that they could decrease asset prices
below zero by going short in assets. As an effect portfolio returns would then become positive
and it would pay even more to short the assets further. Without any short sales constraints this
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would result in unlimited arbitrage opportunities, ruling out the possibility of any type of equilibria.
The consumption of investor i results from his investment strategies as follows. The consump-
tion function of the i-th investor is defined as ci : ∆K+1+ → RS+1+ by ci(λi) :=
(
ci0(λ
i), ci1(λ
i)
)
,
where ci1(λ
i) =
(
cis(λ
i), s ∈ S) is the consumption of the i− th investor over states s ∈ S according
to his investment strategy λi:
ci0(λ
i) = λi0 w
i (1)
cis(λ
i) =
∑
k∈K
Aks
λikw
i
qk
s ∈ S. (2)
Recall that all assets are in unit supply. The equilibrium price system q then is given by the
investment strategies by requiring qk =
∑
i∈I λ
i
kw
i for all assets k ∈ K. Hence market clearing
prices are the wealth average of the investor‘s strategies.
Given the probabilities p, the preferences of the i-th investor are represented by an expected
utility function Ui : RS+1+ → R defined by Ui(ci(λi)) = ui0(ci0(λi)) + βiU i1(ci1(λi)), where βi is a
real-valued discount factor, 0 ≤ βi ≤ 1, and ui0 : R+ → R, and U i1 : RS+ → R is defined by
U i1(c
i
1(λ
i)) :=
∑
s∈S
ps u
i
1(c
i
s(λ
i)),
where ui1 : R+ → R. Note that Ui = (ui0, U i1). We arrive at
[Ui ◦ ci](λi) = Ui(ci(λi)) = ui0(ci0(λi)) + βi
∑
s∈S
psu
i
1(c
i
s(λ
i)). (3)
We make the following standard assumption about the utility function for any i ∈ I:
• uit : R+ → R, t = 0, 1, is twice continuously differentiable,
• strictly increasing, strictly concave and
• (INADA): for any c ∈ R+, ∂∂c uit(c) →∞ as c → 0.
Recently, Alos-Ferrer and Ania [1] have studied Nash equilibria in a similar model when agents
are risk neutral. This case requires different techniques. It turns out that all agents choosing a
portfolio with weights equal to the relative expected payoffs is the unique Nash equilibrium.
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3 The equilibrium concept: A first definition
In a competitive equilibrium the agents take the market’s price system q∗ as given. This situation
is different in the Nash equilibrium where investors anticipate that trading alters prices on the
market. Investor j, thinking strategically, knows that q˜k(λ˜
i
(wi)) = λ˜ikw
i +
∑
j $=i λ˜
j
kw
j , k ∈ K.
Hence for a given wealth distribution, the equilibrium price system q˜ is anticipated to depend on
the set of investment strategies λ˜, i.e. q˜ = q˜(λ˜). Consequently, any individual‘s optimal strategy
λ˜
i
depends directly on the strategies of all other traders i′ ∈ I(−i). On a market both types of
investors, i.e. those following the competitive equilibrium concept and those following the Nash
equilibrium concept, coexist.
The consumption of a competitively behaving investor on A therefore is
ci(λi; q) =
λi0wi,
(∑
k∈K
Aks
λikw
i
qk
)
s∈S
 , q given, i ∈ IC ,
while the consumption of a strategically behaving investor i on A relative to investors {j )= i}
yields
ci(λi;λ(−i)) =
λi0wi,
(∑
k∈K
Aks
λikw
i
λikw
i +
∑
j $=i λ
j
kw
j
)
s∈S
 , λ(−i) = (λjk)j $=i given i ∈ IN
Note that we have partitioned the set of investors I into the set of those following the competitive
strategy IC and those following the Nash strategy, IN , i.e. I = IC ∪ IN .
Now we are in a position to define Competitive Nash Equilibria:
Definition 1 (Competitive Nash Equilibrium (CNE)) Given an economy with wealth dis-
tribution w ∈ RI++, a Competitive Nash Equilibrium is a pair (qˆ, λˆ), λˆ = (λˆi, i ∈ I), such that for
all investors i ∈ IC ∪ IN the following conditions are fulfilled simultaneously
• λˆi ∈ argmax
λi∈∆K+1+
[
Ui ◦ ci
]
(λi) (4)
• qˆk =
∑
i∈I
λˆikw
i, k ∈ K, (5)
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where the consumption of a competitively behaving investor is
ci(λi; qˆ) =
λi0wi,
(∑
k∈K
Aks
λikw
i
qˆk
)
s∈S
 , qˆ given, i ∈ IC ,
while the consumption of a strategically behaving investor i relative to investors {j )= i} is
ci(λi; λˆ
(−i)
) =
λi0wi,
(∑
k∈K
Aks
λikw
i
λikw
i +
∑
j $=i λˆ
j
kw
j
)
s∈S
 , (λˆ)j $=i given i ∈ IN
3.1 The FOCs and State price Vectors in CE and NE
In the following we will show that under the conditions made for the utility function the First
Order Condition (FOC) is sufficient for determining the optimum. Let us therefore first derive the
First Order Condition for CNE.
Lemma 1 Consider i ∈ I with wealth wi ∈ R+. Defining the scaled nabla operator ∇¯i = (∇¯is)s∈S,
where ∇¯is := βi
(
∂ui0(c
i
0)
∂ci0
)−1
· ∂∂cis , the first order condition for the optimization problem for a CNE
(q,λ), λ = (λi) reads
q = A ∇¯iU i1
(
ci1(λ
i)
) • N i(λ), (6)
where • denotes the componentwise multiplication of two vectors. N i(λ) has components
N ik(λ) =
 1 i ∈ IC1− λikwi∑
j λ
j
kwj
i ∈ IN
(7)
Furthermore, the First Order Condition is necessary and also sufficient for determining the maxi-
mum.
Proof 1 The agent’s optimization problem reads max[Ui◦ci](λi) subject to the conditions∑Kk=0 λik =
1 and λik ≥ 0. Defining g(λi) :=
∑K
k′=0 λ
i
k′ , the first order conditions (FOCs) are
∂
∂λik
[
Ui ◦ ci
]
(λi) ≤ α ∂
∂λik
g(λi) +
K∑
k=0
α′k, R , α,α′k ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K
Because of the INADA assumption about the utility function Ui, we can exclude the cases {α =
0}∨ {α′k = 0}k=0..K and hence all solutions are interior. Since Ui is assumed to be increasing, the
FOCs hold with equality and we obtain
wi = βi
∑
s
ps
∂
∂cis
ui1(cis(λ
i))
∂
∂ci0
ui0(ci0(λ
i))
(
∂cis(λ
i)
∂λik
)
. (8)
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Denoting by ∇¯is the operator for the scaled partial derivative
∇¯is := βi
(
∂ui0(ci0)
∂ci0
)−1
· ∂
∂cis
,
the FOC for the k-th component in K becomes
wi =
∑
s
∇¯is U i1
(
ci1(λ
i)
)(∂cis(λi)
∂λik
)
.
A straightforward calculation yields
∂cis(λ
i)
∂λik
= wi
∑
k′
Ak
′
s
(
∂λik′
∂λik
1
qk′
− λ
i
k′
(qk′)2
∂qk′
∂λik
)
=
wiAks
qk
(
1− λ
i
kw
i∑
j λ
j
kw
j
δi
)
,
where δi = 1 if i ∈ IN and 0 if i ∈ IC . Thus, by defining the so called Nash term
N ik(λ) = 1−
λikw
i∑
j λ
j
kw
j
δi. k ∈ K (9)
the First Order Condition takes the form
qk =
(∑
s
Aks ∇¯isU i1
(
ci1(λ
i)
))N ik(λ) (10)
q = A ∇¯i U i1
(
ci1(λ
i)
) • N i(λ) i ∈ I, (11)
where ∇¯i is the vector of the scaled partial derivatives ∇¯is defined above and • denotes the compo-
nentwise multiplication of two vectors.
Note that FOC for CE and NE only differ by a factor N i(λ). Moreover, note that for δ = 1
we get
N ik(λ) =
∑
j $=i λ
j
kw
j∑
j λ
j
kw
j
. (12)
It remains to be shown that this condition is sufficient for determining the maximum. This follows
from above because cis is concave in each component s since[
∂2cis
∂λik∂λ
i
k′
]
=
 −
Aksw
i
q2k
δi ≤ 0 k = k′
0 k )= k′
Hence, as a composition of concave functions, [Ui ◦ ci] is componentwise concave and so the FOC
is necessary and also sufficient for determining the maximum.
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In the case of a population with homogenous behavior this reduces to the standard definitions.
Corollary 1 (Competitive equilibrium) Consider a 2 period economy with I investors I = IC
and wealth w ∈ RI+, where investor i has an utility function Ui = (ui0, U i1) : RS+1+ → R as defined
above. Then a competitive equilibrium is a tuple (q∗,λ∗), λ∗ = (λ∗i, i ∈ I), where q∗ ∈ RK+ and
λ∗i ∈ ∆K+1+ such that
q∗ = A ∇¯iU i1(ci1(λ∗i)) ∀i ∈ IC where (13)
cis(λ
∗i) =
∑
k∈K
Aks
λ∗ik w
i∑
j∈I λ
∗j
k w
j
(14)
Corollary 2 (Nash equilibrium) Consider a 2 period economy with I investors I = IN and
wealth w ∈ RI+, where investor i has an utility function Ui = (ui0, U i1) := RS+1+ → R as defined
above. Then a Nash equilibrium is a pair (q˜, λ˜), λ˜ = (λ˜
i
, i ∈ I), where q˜ ∈ R+ and λ˜i ∈ ∆K+1+
such that
q˜ = A ∇¯iU i1(ci1(λ˜i)) • N i(λ˜) ∀i ∈ IN where (15)
cis(λ˜
i) =
∑
k∈K
Aks
λ˜ikw
i∑
j∈I λ˜
j
kw
j
(16)
4 A Limit Theorem
While in general CE and NE differ for small economies, both coincide in the limit of a large
economy. Let us consider a market on which a N-multiplicity of investors act, i.e. we have N · I
agents. Each agent i is supposed to have N identical replica i(1), .., i(N) having identical utility
functions Ui,n = Ui and income distribution wi,n = wi following the strategies λi,n. We assume
that supply or equivalently payoffs are scaled appropriately, i.e. A(N) =
(
fk(N)Aks
)
k∈K,s∈S
, where
fk(N) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ K. Then for strategically acting agents N i,(N)k (λ) := 1 − λ
i
kw
i
N
∑I
j=1 λ
j
kw
j
for
k ∈ K. The following statement follows immediately from Theorem 1.
Corollary 3 Let λ˜
i,n ∈ ∆K+1+ , i = 1..I, n = 1..N be a Nash optimal investment strategy for the
i − th investor in a N fold replica economy as defined above. Then λ˜(i,n) → λ∗,i as N → ∞
provided that fk(N)N → 1 for all k, where λ∗i is the optimal competitive strategy of investor i in the
one fold replica, N = 1.
Proof 2 According to equation 11 the FOC for the N replica NE economy is as follows
q˜ = A(N)∇¯iU i1(ci1(λ˜i) • N i,(N)(λ˜),
11
where q˜k =
∑I,N
i,n=1 λ˜
i,n
k w
i,n = N
∑I
i=1 λ˜
i
kw
i such that we have
N
I∑
i=1
λikw
i =
(∑
s
Aks ∇¯isU i1(ci1(λ˜i)
)
fk(N)N i,(N)k (λ˜)
Finally observe that N i,(N)k (λ˜) → 1 as N →∞. Hence if N →∞ and fk(N)/N → 1 the expression
reduces to the FOC of CE. Therefore, under these conditions q˜kq∗k → 1 and hence the claim follows.
5 Two-Period Fund Separation
In this section we demonstrate that increasing the size of the economy is not the only case in which
competitive and strategic behavior become similar. Actually for any finite economy it is shown
that for this to hold a form of two-fund separation is decisive. Recall that similar forms of two fund
separation are known to be the basis for many important results in finance, as for examples the
CAPM. We will discuss the distinction between the two fund separation in our paper and that of
CAPM once we have defined our notion. The investment strategy of investor i is λi ∈ ∆K+1+ ⊂ RK .
We now represent each investment strategy in terms of elementary investment strategies λk ∈ RK+ ,
where
(λk)k′ =
 0 k′ )= k1 k′ = k .
Hence λk is the relative investment in the asset k ∈ K. Each K-subset of elementary investment
strategies clearly constitutes a basis for the space of investment strategies. Thus each investment
strategy λi ∈ ∆K+1+ can be written as a linear superposition of these elementary investment
strategies
λi =
K∑
k=0
λikλk, λ
i
k ∈ [0, 1],
K∑
k=0
λik = 1
— Please insert Figure 1 about here —
Two Fund Separation concerns the partition of an optimal fund into two regimes. Here we
consider separation of an equilibrium fund over periods, i.e. the partitioning of wealth distribution
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w into 0 period consumption and 1 period portfolio selection on the security market A. We
therefore call this separation Two-Period Fund Separation (2pFS).
Definition 2 (Two-period-Fund Separation (2pFS)) Let λi(wi) ∈ ∆K+1+ be the investment
strategy of agent i on the market A in a CNE economy given his wealth wi ∈ R+. Then 2pFS
holds if and only if for all investment strategies λi ∈ ∆K+1+ , there exists a unique common portfolio
investment λ¯ ∈ ∆K+1+ for all investors i on the security market A such that
λi(wi) ∈
〈
λ0, λ¯
〉
∩ ∆K+1+ (17)
for an equilibrium strategy for all investors i ∈ I.
Since dim
〈
λ0, λ¯
〉
= 1, this is equivalent to saying that each investment strategy is uniquely
represented by a real number λi0(wi) ∈ [0, 1]:
λi(wi) := λi0(w
i)λ0 + (1− λi0(wi))λ¯,
where λi0(wi) is the relative investment of investor i in 0 period consumption and λ¯ is the unique
mutual fund on A. This situation is displayed in Figure 1. In other words, under 2pFS optimal
investment strategies only differ in relative investments in 0 period consumption. Investment
strategies then have the following representation with respect to the coordinate system (λ0, λ¯):
λi(wi) =
(
λi0(w
i), (1− λi0(wi))
)
(18)
Standard two fund separation (Cass and Stiglitz [5]) refers to the separation of investment decisions
in a riskless asset and a fund of risky asset components. In our model zero period consumption
plays a similar role as the riskless asset in standard two fund separation since it also guarantees
risk free payoffs - however delivered one period before the other assets pay off. If in our model some
of the assets k ∈ K were risk free then, due to borrowing and saving, the different time periods of
the riskless payoffs would not matter. Yet our model uses a slightly stronger structure than only
separating between riskless and risky payoffs. In our model additive separability over time and the
INADA conditions imply that one has to consume something in period 0, i.e. riskfree consumption
is essential and cannot be substituted by possibly risky consumption.
The main question is which properties on the market structure A and on the utility functions
Ui permit 2pFS. Our first statement concerns the market, the second the utility functions. We
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first show in Theorem 2 that 2period fund separation holds for any economy provided there is no
aggregate risk. Ever since Borch and Malinvaud [2, 13] this case has been intensively studied in
the literature. Furthermore, as Theorem 3 shows, 2pFS also holds if utility functions are CRRA.
Cass and Stiglitz [5] have already found the importance of CRRA for fund separation. In our
model with only one period, CRRA is equivalent to having a single fund on assets. Let us consider
these cases in more detail.
Theorem 2 Consider an economy without aggregate risk, i.e.
∑
k A
k
s = a, a ∈ R+ and non zero
endowment, i.e. (wi)i ∈ RI+. Then there exists an equilibrium in which 2pFS holds, the mutual
fund being
λ¯k =
∑
s∈S
ps
Aks∑
k′ A
k′
s
=
1
a
∑
s∈S
psA
k
s .
This particular mutual fund preserves a special notation, λ¯ = λ∗.
Proof 3 Obviously
∑
k λ¯k = 1. We show that, provided there is no aggregate risk, there exists
an λi0 ∈ [0, 1] such that λi = λi0λ0 + (1 − λi0)λ¯ is an CNE equilibrium. Suppose 2pFS holds. Let
λˆ0 :=
(
λˆ10, .., λˆ
I
0,
)
and define νi(λˆ0) =
1−λˆi0∑
j(1−λˆj0)wj
, then the Nash terms becomes
N ik(λˆ0) = 1− νi(λˆ0)wi ∀k ∈ K,
while consumption reduces to ci0(λˆ0) = λˆi0wi and cis(λˆ0) =
(∑
k A
k
s
)
νi(λˆ0)wi for all s ∈ S. Note
that if λˆi0 → 1, then νi(λˆi0) → 0 and so cis → 0, while if λˆi0 → 0 these quantities remain finite.
If there is no aggregate risk, i.e.
∑
k A
k
s = a, the consumption is independent of s, i.e. ci(λˆ0) =
aνi(λˆ0)wi 1, where 1 = (1, .., 1) is an S-dimensional vector and ci is constant over all states s. By
defining ci(λˆ0) = aνi(λˆ0)wi, we write ci(λˆ0) = ci(λˆ0)1. Under the NAR assumption with these
definition the FOC for CNE takes the form∑
s
∇¯is U i1(ci(λˆ0)1)Aks
(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
= λ¯k
∑
j
(1− λˆj0)wj
Thus we arrive at∑
j
(1− λˆj0)wj =
(∑
s
Aksps
λ¯k
)
βi ∂∂ci u
i
1(ci(λˆ0))
∂
∂ci0
ui0(ci0(λˆ0)
(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(19)
= a
βi ∂∂ci u
i
1(ci(λˆ0))
∂
∂ci0
ui0(ci0(λˆ0)
(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(20)
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It remains to be shown that a solution in λˆ0 exists. Therefore note that the left hand side
∑
j(1−
λˆj0)wj is positive and finite for any λˆ0. If λˆi0 → 0 then 0 < νi(λˆ0) < ∞ and the term βi ∂∂ci u
i
1(ci(λˆ0))
is positive and finite, while ∂∂ci0
ui0(νi(λˆ0)wi) → ∞ and hence the right hand side tends to 0 as
λˆi0 → 0. On the other hand, if λˆi0 → 1 then νi(λˆ0) → 0 and therefore ci(λˆ0) → 0. While
0 < ∂∂ci0
ui0(νi(λˆ0)) < ∞, ∂∂ci u
i
1(ci(λˆ0)) →∞ and hence the right hand side tends to ∞ as λˆi0 → 1.
Since both sides are continuous in λˆ0, a solution exists.
In the mutual fund λ¯, the weight of any asset turns out to be the expected value of its payoff
relative to the total payoff of all assets. This coincides with so called log-optimal pricing (cf. Long
[?]). Indeed the same mutual fund is obtained in the case of logarithmic utility functions - a special
case of CRRA which is covered by our Theorem 3.
— Please insert Figure 2 about here —
Some intuition for this result holding in the case of no aggregate risk is provided by referring
to efficient risk sharing (cf. Borch [2] and Malinvaud [13]) as displayed in Figure 2. Since all
agents have expected utility functions and beliefs are homogenous, in the case of no aggregate risk
efficient risk sharing is obtained at ”fair” asset prices, i.e. at prices that are equal the expected
payoffs of the assets. In this case every consumer receives a fraction of the aggregate payoffs and
hence no individual needs to carry any risk. As Borch and Malinvaud have shown, this is clearly
a competitive equilibrium.
When agents take their market impact into account they realize that their budget sets are not
given by a budget line but by a curve that lies below the budget line and coincides with it only at
the point of efficient risk sharing. This is because any demand different to the efficient level would
turn prices to the disadvantage1 of the agent deviating from the efficient allocation. This intuition
can be derived from a reinterpretation of the first-order-condition
qk/N ik(λ) =
∑
s
Aks ∇¯is U i1
(
ci1(λ
i)
)
k ∈ K, i ∈ I.
Writing the first-order-condition this way, on changing the asset allocation λ1 on A taking ratios
1Recall that agents are not endowed with assets so that changing prices does not change their income.
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of any two components of the vector on the right hand side, gives the changes in the marginal
rates of substitution between any two assets while the corresponding ratios on the left-hand-side
gives the perceived changes of relative asset prices. Now suppose a competitive equilibrium is
obtained in which this first-order-condition holds ignoring the K Nash-terms. Then choosing the
same portfolio as in the competitive equilibrium is also budget feasible in the situation with strate-
gic interaction. Moreover, as prices are turned to your disadvantage, the perceived budget set
in the case of strategic interaction is included in the budget set keeping prices as given. The
first-order-condition shows that, moreover, the slope of the budget set anticipating your market
impact coincides with that of the competitive budget set at those points where all agents choose
the same portfolio. This is because at these points all K Nash terms identical. Hence, also in the
case of strategic behavior, independently of the risk aversion, the market outcome will be given by
complete risk sharing.
— Please insert Figure 3 about here —
CAPM and NoAggregateRisk We illustrate this theorem by considering an economy without
aggregate risk and two equally probable states s = 1, 2 in which two investors i = 1, 2 with identical wealth
w1 = w2, compete for two assets k = 1, 2. Investors can act competitively or strategically. Asset 1 has
payoff (1,α), while asset 2 has payoff (0, 1− α) over states 1, 2. The market structure is given by
A =
 1 α
0 1− α
 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Note that this market has no aggregate risk, i.e.
∑
k A
k
s = 1 independent of s. The utility function
ui := R+ → R considered is of the form ui(c) = c− γ2 c2. This function is identical across periods and
also among consumers. Note that this function does not satisfy the INADA assumptions made
above. Hence this ”illustration” is not really covered by our previous theorems. Nevertheless, we
see from Figure 4 that all implications of our theorems also hold for this important case.
— Please insert Figure 4 about here —
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In order to study the case of AGGREGATE RISK consider the market A given as
A =
 2 α
0 1− α
 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1,
while all other specifications are the same as in the example above, see Figure 4. One observation
in this case is that consumers with identical characteristics [Ui, wi] choose the same portfolio if
market behavior among consumers is homogenous. Both for the economy in which both agents
behave competitively and also for the case of strategic behavior the same portfolio is chosen. On
the other hand if we consider an economy with identical consumer characteristics but with different
market behavior, then in the presence of aggregate risk the portfolios differ.
The intuition for this observation is the following: The Nash equilibrium we have computed is
a symmetric Nash equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which identical agents choose identical strategies.
This symmetry is also true in the competitive equilibria. Moreover, the available total payoffs
are independent of the market behavior we consider. Hence, since there are no redundant assets,
with identical consumers‘ characteristics the portfolio choices in symmetric Nash equilibria coin-
cide with those in the competitive equilibrium. But still competitive and Nash equilibria differ
with respect to the money invested in the mutual fund. On the other hand, if we mix competitive
with strategic behavior in one market, then the strategically acting agent will invest less in the
assets and will consume more today so that he evaluates his portfolio of assets at a different second
period wealth level. Hence, if relative risk aversion depends on the wealth level, as it does in the
case of quadratic utilities, then both agents will choose different portfolios even though they have
identical characteristics [Ui, wi].
— Please insert Figure 5 about here —
This suggests that if the portfolio choice is independent from the wealth level, as it is in the
case of constant relative risk aversion, then all investors should hold the same mutual fund. The
next theorem states that even with aggregate risk 2pFS holds, if all investors have identical relative
risk aversion.
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Theorem 3 Suppose there are no redundant assets, i.e. rank A = K. Moreover, assume all
investors have identical second period relative risk aversion, i.e. ui1 = u1 for all i ∈ I, where
u1 : R+ → R is defined by
u1(c) =
 cη, 0 < η < 1ln(c) c > 0
Then in every CNE 2pFS holds, i.e. there exists a common mutual fund λ¯ ∈ ∆K+1+ with
∑K
k=0 λ¯k =
1 such that
λˆ
i ∈
〈
λ0, λ¯
〉
∩∆K+1+ ∀i ∈ I.
The mutual fund is of the form
λ¯k = 1/µ
∑
s
ps
Aks
(
∑
k A
k
s)
1−η , (21)
where µ > 0 is a normalization constant so that
∑K
k=1 λ¯k = 1.
Proof 4 Part I: Recall that λ =
(
λi
)
i∈I is the vector of investment strategies on the market.
Consider two investors i, j ∈ I with identical utility functions Ui,Uj : RS+1+ → R. Note that
∇¯iU i1(ci1) is homogenous of degree ν ∈ {−1, η − 1} for all i ∈ I. Both ’see’ the same price sys-
tem q. Hence, since rank A = K, the associated linear map is injective and so the pre-image
of q is unique. It thus follows that ∇¯iU i1(ci1(λi)) • N i(λ) = ∇¯jU j1(cj1(λj)) • N j(λ) and there-
fore ∇¯iU i1(ci1(λi))‖∇¯jU j1(cj1(λj)). Since ∇¯iU i1(ci1(λi)) and ∇¯jU j1(cj(λj)) are homogenous of the
same degree ν and ci1, c
j
1 are homogenous of degree 1 in λ
i,λj, it follows that λi‖λj for any pair
i, j. Hence all investment strategies {λi} are co-linear and are in the same subspace, i.e. for every
pair (i, j) there exists a real valued scalar 0 ≤ ((i, j) ≤ 1 such that cj = l(i, j)ci. Particularly if
λˆi is an CNE investment strategy, then there exists some factor ( > 0 such that λ¯ := (λˆi and∑
k λ¯k = 1 is the unique mutual fund which spans the corresponding sum space 〈λ0, λ¯〉.
Part II: Recall that under 2pFS, with the notations from the proof of Theorem 2, the FOC reads∑
s
Aks ∇¯is U i1
(
ci1(λˆ0)
)(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
= λ¯k
∑
j
(1− λˆj0)wj ,
where cis(λˆ0) =
(∑
k A
k
s
)
νi(λ0)wi is the consumption in state s. Assume that λˆi0 > 0 and define
K(λˆi0) := βi
(
∂
∂ci0
ui0(ci0)
)−1
. Note that K(λˆi0) → 0 as λˆi0 → 0, while it is positive and finite for
18
λi0 > 0. Then the FOC equivalently reads∑
s
Aks ∇¯is U i1
(
ci(λˆ0)
)(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
= λ¯k
(1− λˆi0)wi
νi(λˆi0)wi
(22)
ηK(λˆi0)
∑
s
psA
k
s
(∑
k
Aks
)η−1(1− νi(λˆ0)wi)(νi(λˆ0)wi)η−1 = λ¯k (1− λˆi0)wi
νi(λˆi0)wi
(23)
ηK(λˆi0)
(∑
s
ps
Aks
(
∑
k A
k
s)
1−η
)(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(νi(λˆ0)wi)η = λ¯k(1− λˆi0)wi, (24)
Inserting (24), we obtain
η/µK(λˆi0)
(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(νi(λˆ0)wi)η = (1− λˆi0)wi (25)
η/µ
(
1− νi(λˆ0)wi
)
(νi(λˆ0)wi)η = (1− λˆi0)wi βi
(
∂
∂ci0
ui0(c
i
0)
)
(26)
The right-hand-side is strictly increasing in λi0 and tends to 0 if λi0 → 1, while it tends to +∞ if
λi0 → 0. To discuss the behavior of the right-hand-side, recall that νi(λi0) → 0 if λi0 → 1, while it
remains positive and finite for λi0 < 1. Put x := νi(λi0)wi, then x ∈ R+. The real valued function
f(x) = (1− x)xη, 0 < η < 1 is concave, ddxf(x)|x=0 = +∞, and has two roots (0, 1). Hence there
exist two solutions of equation (26), a trivial one λˆi0 = 1 and a non trivial one 0 < λˆi0 < 1.
Note that the general mutual fund, see equation 21, includes those for the case of NAR, log-
utilities, and also of risk-neutrality: Indeed for η = −1 we get that λ¯k is the expected relative
payoff of asset k, while for η = 0 we get that λ¯k is the relative expected payoff of asset k.
Log utility function on a market with aggregate risk For illustration we consider the same
setting as defined above, i.e. a market with aggregate risk, but now consider the case that both investors
have identical CRRA utility functions, particularly logarithmic ones, i.e. ui1(c) = ln(c). The extended
market structure thus is
A =
 2 α
0 1− α
 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
For simplicity we assume that states 1 and 2 are equally probable, i.e. p1 = p2 = 1/2, and wealth distri-
bution is w1 = w2.
— Please insert Figure 6 about here —
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Theorem 3 states an interesting property of CNE. However it does not establish the existence
of CNE with these properties. The next proposition shows that such an investment strategy in
fact establishes a CNE.
Proposition 1 Let λi ∈ 〈λ0, λ¯〉. Then there exists a real valued coefficient 0 ≤ λi0 ≤ 1 such that
λi = λi0λ0 + (1− λi0)λ¯
is a CNE investment strategy for investor i.
Proof 5 Using notations as in the proof of Theorem 2 and by defining functions F and Gk by
F(λ0) := A∇¯iU i1((
∑
k A
k
s)νi(λ0)wi) and Gk(λ0) := λ¯k
∑
j(1− λj0)wj, the FOC reads
Fk(λ0)(1− νi(λ0)wi) = Gk(λ0).
Note that 0 < Gk(λ0) < ∞ for any given λ0 while if λi0 → 0, then Fk(λ0) → 0 and if λi0 → 1 then
Fk(λ0) →∞. Since both functions are continuous in λ0, a solution exists.
The next theorem shows that under 2pFS agents acting strategically invest less in the mutual
fund than those acting competitively. As a consequence of this, the utility level of the agents in a
market in which every agent behaves strategically is higher than the utility level in a competitive
market. Note that this statement does not conflict with the first welfare theorem, i.e. with the
Pareto-efficiency of competitive equilibria. From a central planning perspective, in our model the
agents are strictly better off consuming almost all their wealth today and betting only very little on
the asset market. This is because the assets are in fixed supply while the first period consumption
good is in infinitely elastic supply.
Theorem 4 Let λ∗i(wi) = λi∗0 (wi)λ0 + (1 − λ∗0(wi))λ¯ be a CE. Then λ˜
i
(wi) = λ˜i0(wi)λ0 +
(
1 −
λ˜i0(wi)
)
λ is a NE for some λ˜i0(wi) ≥ λi∗0 (wi).
Proof 6 Consider an economy with given wealth distribution w = (wi, i = 1, ..., I) and assume
that λ(wi) ∈
〈
λ0, λ¯
〉
is a CE. We show that there exists λ˜i0 such that λ˜(wi) = λ˜i0λ0 + (1 − λ˜i0)λ¯
is a NE. For the sake of simplicity let λ0 = (λi0) :=
(
λi0(wi), i ∈ I
)
be the vector of 0 period
investments of agents i. Then define the following function F i(λ0) := A∇¯iU i1(ci1(λ0)) − q∗. In
fact ∂
∂λi0
F ik(λ0) > 0 since cis(λ0) → 0 if λi0 → 1 and hence ∇¯isui1(cis) → +∞ according to the
INADA assumption on ui1. The FOCs for CE then takes the form
F ik(λ0) = 0.
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Let λ∗0 such that for given w = (wi), F ik(λ∗0) = 0 for all k. Finally define Gi(λ0) := A∇¯iU i1(ci1) •
N i(λ0) − q(λ0). Let λ#0 be such that q(λ#0 ) = q∗. Then since N ik(λ#0 ) ≤ 1, we have Gik(λ#0 ) ≤
F ik(λ#0 ). Hence it follows that λ˜0 implicitly defined by Gi(λ˜0) = 0 fulfills
λ˜0 ≥ λ∗0,
or equivalently λ˜0(wi) ≥ λ∗0(wi).
Hence under two-period fund separation, thinking strategically, i.e. taking into account that
prices ”slip away” on increasing orders, does matter for the share of wealth invested in the mutual
fund, however it does not affect the portfolio allocation within the group of assets.
6 Asset pricing implications
From Corollary 1 above it is clear that CE and NE prices are the same in the limit of infinitely large
markets with homogenous investor’s population, i.e. for I → ∞. What about prices on markets
in which some investors act strategically and others do not. The question is whether thinking
strategically matters for asset prices on small markets. The next statement shows that relative
asset prices are independent of the composition of market participants as long as two-period Fund
Separation holds. Particularly if 2pFS holds, then relative asset prices in a pure competitive and
a pure Nash investor population are identical to those in combined Competitive Nash economies.
Corollary 4 If 2pFS holds, relative prices are independent of the composition of the agent’s pop-
ulation.
Proof 7 According to the market clearing condition, under 2pFS prices fulfill qˆk =
∑
i∈I λˆ
i
kw
i for
all k ∈ K. By Theorem 2 we have 2pFS in the CNE economy with the unique mutual fund λ¯.
Hence we have for the prices of assets k ∈ K
qˆk = λ¯k
∑
i
(1− λi0)wi
such that qˆkqˆj is in fact independent of the partitioning of I.
Recall the two examples mentioned above. We in fact observe that for our respective conditions
relative prices are identical in the different regimes. By (C/C) we denote a regime in which both
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investors have competitive behavior, in a (N/N) regime both investors behave strategically while
in the (C/N) regime investor 1 acts competitively while investor 2 behaves strategically. The
following table gives the relatives prices on a market with aggregate risk and a market without,
when both investors have CAPM preferences and follow different strategies. As above the market
is
A =
 2 α
0 1− α
 , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Note that, as mentioned above, the identity of prices in homogenous (C / C) and (N / N) economies
is a result of the symmetry of the setting!
α CAPM - NAR CAPM - AR
(C/C) (N/N) (C/N) (C/C) (N/N) (C/N)
0 1 1 1 1.33.. 1.33.. 1.226
.1 1.22.. 1.22.. 1.22.. 1.593 1.593 1.462
.2 1.55.. 1.55.. 1.55.. 1.917 1.917 1.755
.3 1.857 1.857 1.857 2.33.. 2.33.. 2.1324
.4 2.33.. 2.33 2.33 2.889 2.889 2.634
.5 2.99.. 2.99 2.99 3.667 3.667 3.334
.6 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.833.. 4.833 4.383
.7 5.66.. 5.66 5.66 6.778 6.778 6.128
.8 9.000 9.000 9.000 10.667 10.667 9.612
.9 19.0 19.0 19.0 22.33.. 22.33.. 20.053
6.1 Derivatives
One field in finance which has taken market impact as a serious concern, is the field of derivatives
in which slippage and liquidity holes have been taken into account when hedging a contingent claim.
A nice intuitive account of these effects for managing derivatives is given in Taleb [19], chapter
4. For a more rigorous analysis along these lines see Frey and Stremme [7] and Scho¨nbucher and
Willmot [18] who have adjusted the famous Black and Scholes formula for slippage of prices. This
literature also recognizes that slippage has some upside: ”Many large traders use their buying
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power to prop up the market in which they accumulate positions” Taleb [19], page 69. To the best
of our knowledge, the pros and cons of the market impact have not been balanced systematically
by this literature. Moreover, it is questionable to consider strategic interaction in which only one
party is allowed to act strategically while the rest of the market is passive.
Introducing derivatives leads to a new strategic aspect of the model considered here. On chang-
ing demand for the underlying asset agents can change the payoffs of the derivative assets that are
based on the prices of that underlying. Indeed in this case it turns out that even with logarithmic
utility functions equilibria depend substantially on the form of market behavior!
We illustrate this aspect by the following simple model of a look-back option. The payoff matrix
is given as
A =
 1 0
α q1
 ,
where q1 is the price of asset 1 determined in the first period. I.e. the second asset pays the price
of the first asset if state 2 occurs. Again states s1 and s2 are equally probable, both investors
are identical, i.e. have the same endowment w1 = w2 and have the same logarithmic utility func-
tions. Investors can act competitively or strategically. Hence there are three situations: Both
act competitively, both act strategically, one investor acts competitively while the other investor
acts strategically. The simulation, Figure 7 shows that the funds chosen by the investors differ
significantly if both follow different strategies.
— Please insert Figure 7 about here —
7 Conclusions and Outlook
We have suggested a simple asset market model in which we analyzed competitive and strategic
behavior simultaneously. We have shown that if for competitive behavior two-fund separation
holds across periods then it also holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the
assets do not depend on whether agents behave strategically or competitively. Those agents acting
strategically will however invest less in the common mutual fund. Constant relative risk aversion
and absence of aggregate risk have been shown to be two alternative sufficient conditions for two-
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period fund separation. With derivatives further strategic aspects arise and strategic behavior is
distinct from competitive behavior even for those utility functions leading to two-fund separation.
These results are first steps in building a new capital asset market model in which strategic
interaction plays some role. Further research may endogeneize wealth by giving agents endowments
in terms of assets. Moreover, the model should be extended to multiple periods.
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Figure 1: The simplex ∆3+ of investment strategies λ = (λ0,λ1) over periods 0 and 1 on a market
A ∈ R2×2+ displayed in R2+.
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Figure 2: Complete Risk Sharing in Competitive and in Nash Equilibrium
Figure 3: Mutual funds for log utility functions on a market with aggregate risk depending on the
market parameter α as defined in the examples.
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Figure 4: Funds chosen by the two CAPM investors on a market WITHOUT aggregate risk.
Funds of investors coincide if both have the same market behavior (dots). The solid line shows the
common mutual fund chosen by BOTH investors even if they act according to different strategies,
particularly investor 1 acts competitively and investor 2 acts strategically. This figure should be
compared with the analogous setting for a market WITH aggregate risk
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Figure 5: Funds chosen by the two CAPM investors on the market WITH AGGRGATE RISK.
Due to the symmetry of the situation funds of investors coincide if both have the same market
behavior (dots), while they choose different funds on the asset market, displayed by lines (dashed
for the competitive investor and dotted for the Nash investor), if they follow different strategies,
i.e. one of them is acting strategically while the other behaviors competitively.
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Figure 6: Fund selection of investors with log utility functions on a market with aggregate risk. Dots
represent mutual funds chosen if both investor follow the same strategy, while the line indicates
mutual funds chosen if one acts strategically while the other competitively. Even if both investors
follow different strategies they choose the same fund on the asset market.
Figure 7: Selection of funds in a small economy with derivatives. Because of symmetry both
investors act identically in a C/C economy or in a N/N economy, while in a C/N economy both
investors clearly behave differently.
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